In elections, should the votes of more educated voters carry greater weight than those of the less educated?
This essay’s main thesis is that weighted voting should not be implemented. Since 2016, when the incumbent
i
...
In elections, should the votes of more educated voters carry greater weight than those of the less educated?
This essay’s main thesis is that weighted voting should not be implemented. Since 2016, when the incumbent
institution of liberal democracy brought two of the most recent political shocks in Brexit and the presidential
election of Donald Trump, there has been a proliferation of prescriptions offered by the commentariat to overcome
the democratic crises we face. Epistocracy – a system of government where votes are apportioned according to
knowledge – is one such proposal under consideration. This essay shall focus on weighted voting, a particular form of
epistocracy proposed by Jason Brennan (2016), whereby votes are weighted according to the political knowledge
that each individual voter possesses, and argue that it should not be implemented.
In this essay I shall firstly outline the main case for a weighted voting form of government, which is that it leads to
better outcomes for society. I shall then raise two principal objections to the model; the first relates to the inherent
process of an inequitable system and its ramifications for social injustice, while the second objection looks how the
outcomes that a weighted voting system produces may not necessarily be ‘better’ for society. After examining
possible counterarguments that uphold the benefits of incentivisation that come with weighted voting, I shall
respond by arguing that there is no guarantee that those in possession of greater political knowledge will
demonstrate unbiased decision-making in their voting, and shall then contend that theories of incentivisation ignore
the perennial social inequalities that the working class are often born into.
The traditional argument for weighted voting is that it should lead to better decisions. Plato, one of the first proponents
of epistocracy, believed that political authority should lie in the hands of the most knowledgeable members of society
(Steinbauer, 2014). Plato contended that only philosophers possessed true knowledge as opposed to the mere beliefs
and opinions held by the rest of the people. Plato uses the Ship of State metaphor to expose the instability of
democratic rule: he asks us to imagine a ship where all those on-board feel entitled to claim the helm. Among the
group, the captain is the only capable navigator, but does not possess the persuasive power to command the ship.
Rather, it is the erratic, insatiable crew members who shout the loudest in their factions and make the boldest claim to
rule, despite having no knowledge of navigation whatsoever. As a result, discipline is replaced with chaos and what
ensues is a wasteful drunken jaunt. The message of Plato’s allegory is clear: ruling is a skill, much like that of
navigation. Therefore, both on the ship and in society as a whole, governance should be in the hands of experts. The
political scientist Jason Brennan (2016) is a modern champion of this school of thought, and argues for a weighted
voting system whereby outcomes reflect ‘what the informed public would want, rather than what the uninformed
public in fact wants’ (para. 20). I shall now explore two principal objections to this viewpoint.
The first issue to raise with weighted voting is the inherent inequality of the system. Through affording greater
weight to the votes of those who possess more knowledge, weighted voting can perpetuate social injustice. There is
currently much disagreement as to what qualifies an individual to possess a greater weight to their vote. Certain
epistemic standards, such as the possession of a university degree, are often ‘disproportionately the privilege of
members of certain races, classes, and (formerly) genders’ (Estlund, 2003, p. 62). It is hardly an exaggeration to note
that if the working class or minority ethnic groups were underrepresented in the voting demographics of a society,
then a result of this could be the suppression of their interests. Moreover, establishing a weighted voting system in
countries where social mobility rates are already low risks the reinforcement of a glass ceiling that would leave
behind a significant proportion of the country’s disadvantaged and deprive them of the platform to express their
views.
The second objection is that weighted voting rests upon the assumption that that the opinions of the educated are
more conducive to better outcomes for society. A direct consequence of this is that the knowledge and opinions
offered by the working class are underappreciated. Brennan (2016) even asserts that most low-income black women
would fail a knowledge test that would qualify one to vote. Nevertheless, ironically it was the very same cleavage in
society (black and female voters) that was most opposed to the election of Donald Trump in 2016 (Crain, 2016), a
result that Brennan himself described as a ‘victory of the uninformed’ (para. 16). Moreover, it is an error to
steadfastly believe that political knowledge should be equated with good judgment; the British government’s
decision to invade Iraq in 2003 serves as a reminder that policymaking by experts does not necessarily produce
successful outcomes. The argument for weighted voting overlooks the fact that the beliefs underpinning a political
decision may often appeal more to emotions rather than knowledge; in such cases, an educated opinion does not
necessarily entail better decision-making.
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